As I See Faith and Reason Part 2

To carry on from Part 1 of this I think we have come to the place where we have contrasted reason and revelation. The first is a process by which, beginning with statements we hold to be more or less true, we look around for things which we find are related in some manner, usually in such a way that the truth of the beginning premise forces us to conclude that whatever follows is also true. We, “build” upon the original beliefs assuming our building follows some internal logic. Usually experience gives us this sense of logic and if we do not have the experience we question the logic. For instance, suppose I said I was feeling sleepy. You respond with “go to bed.” The beginning statement, “I’m sleepy” is taken to be an accurate description of my current feelings. You respond reasonably with “go to bed.” Most people sense the internal “logic” of this pair and see the response as reasonable. But the actual logic leaves a lot implied, for instance, the belief that being sleepy is a problem to be solved. It is not that we stop and actually discuss if it’s a problem so much as we assume that it is. And unless there are other unspoken things we perceive which would preclude my going to bed, the suggested solution appears a reasonable one. And finally, given that I have stated I am sleepy, that being sleepy is a problem and problems should be solved, if you suggest that I “go to bed.” -- you are assuming I too believe that the problem can be solved by sleeping and that the problem should be solve.

In this little example a number of things can be seen about reason. First, that in any response to life we assume a lot. In the above case, my statement that “I’m sleepy,” elicited a response: “Go to bed.” The assumptions which made the response appear reasonable were unstated and to the degree I sense their presence I would not have a problem seeing the response as reasonable. However, if I did not hold to the set of assumptions in which the response was resting I might very well think the response unreasonable. What is reasonable is socially constructed within a context. And in most cases we do little to examine the “reasonableness” of our statements. But when we do we find that we are no longer speaking of what is reasonable, but of the process itself.

The process of reasoning involves a number of things. Language, logic, evidence, and propriety, to name a few. If I make a political statement to you and you disagree, depending on the situation, you might respond by attacking the terms I use, the evidence I provide, the logic I use, or the appropriateness of my even making the argument. All of these can be seen as reasonable responses to my statements, depending on how you view my political statement. On the other hand, if you strongly disagree with my position you might very well respond to my response by saying it is an unreasonable response! In other words, it is generally not the logic of what a person says that determines if their communication is reasonable, but the group or individual to whom the speaker is speaking. For this reason the most persuasive person is the one the audience is already predisposed to believe – so long as he or she does not stray too far from the audiences assumptions. And when the speaker does succeed in moving the audience in attention, affirmation and/or action, the three “A’s” of persuasion, he or she generally does so by structuring the communication in such a way that the audience believes the “new” belief is consistent with their basic assumptions. For this reason most good arguments begin with what the audience believes and shows them how that belief leads to the new construct. It is this process of revealing the new construct as just an outgrowth of this or that premise which provides the logic of the argument. And logic is primarily a system of classification.

Classifying things is a primary duty of any language. Things which look, sound, feel, tastes, and smell alike are generally thought to be more alike. As far back as Aristotle, at least, people have thought that our thinking process involved the physical universe around us in a sort of mental classification of things. If two things appear to be of the same class we tend to believe they are more the same thing than if they don’t appear alike. This similarity based process allows us to see overlapping categories in such a way that the two overlapping categories are often seen in a cause-effect relationship. In other words, we often believe that because two things are alike in some manner one has caused the other. In our example above we see that the statement “I am sleepy” is taken as a true reflection of my current state. Because the person to whom I am speaking has categorized me as a normal human being and it is normal for normal human beings to make the statement “I am sleepy” he or she is not surprised or doubtful about my statement. The class of things, “human” can be found in a larger class of things which can get “sleepy.” In some ways we sense that being human must cause the being sleepy because our understanding of the two terms is that one, “humanness” naturally leads to the other, “sleepiness.”

This is reason, normally unexpressed and unexamined. As stated above, unless you find other reasons to object to my unexpressed assumptions, you perceive my speech as reasonable. In fact, so much of what we communicate to each other based on unstated assumptions it is difficult to believe than any communicative act is fully reasoned. Which, when it comes to faith, means that it is doubtful any belief system is based on anything other than faith. Faith in our own reasoning processes, if nothing else.

So you have reason and faith. Reason alone is based not upon logic, but upon unspoken assumptions of the most basic kind. If I claim, for instance, to have walked on water, you might very well doubt my sanity. But for what reason? Because you have never witnessed a person who can walk on water? Because you do not believe a person can walk on water? Because, to you, walking on water smacks of superstition and religious mythology? Because you can’t walk on water? All of these are, maybe, good reasons, but they are conclusions to a large group of unstated assumptions about my claim and the universe in general. That’s the problem with being “reasonable” it’s only reasonable to those who already believe whatever it is you want them to be reasonable about.

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